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Medical Malpractice Actions Based on Lack of
Informed Consent in "Full-Disclosure"
Jurisdictions: The Enigmatic Affirmative Defense
David E. Seidelson*
Occasionally, I find myself confronted with a legal conclusion
that is enigmatic to me. I don't mean simply a conclusion with
which I happen to disagree. Nor do I mean a conclusion with
whose underlying rationale I happen to disagree. Rather, I mean a
legal conclusion that makes me wonder why any court would fashion such a result. This is one of those occasions.
Those jurisdictions that require the physician to disclose to the
patient all material risks incident to proposed therapy as a condition precedent to securing the patient's informed consent to that
therapy simultaneously afford the physician the affirmative defense that disclosure of the risk that eventuated would have had an
adverse effect on the patient's physical or emotional well-being
and, therefore, nondisclosure of that risk was consistent with the
professional standard of disclosure.' Why do those "full-disclos* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. I have combined compliance with the professional standard of disclosure and the
"therapeutic privilege" because I believe that in reality the two constitute a unitary defense.
If called upon to defend withholding of information [based on the therapeutic privilege] in a legal action, the [medical care] provider must prove not only the factual
element of the patient's sensitivity but also that other practitioners would have done
the same under the circumstances involved. Thus, the therapeutic privilege defense
may need the support of expert medical testimony, a requirement that most physicians should not find difficult to satisfy.
A. Rosoff, Informed Consent: A Guide for Health Care Providers 55 (Aspor Systems Corp.
1981).
In Canterbury [v Spence], Dr. Spence claimed that "communication of that risk (paralysis) to the patient is not good medical practice because it might deter patients
from undergoing needed surgery and might produce adverse psychological reactions
which could preclude the success of the operation." Such claims will almost invariably be raised by physicians since they are derived from deeply held tenets of medical
practice. Judge Robinson's enigmatic phrase of "just due" certainly suggests that the
medical professional standard would be applicable in such a case, raising profound
questions about the extent to which the novel legal standard has been swallowed up
by the traditional and reasonable medical standard.
In fact, medical judgment was given its "just due" twice. It could also be invoked
under the "therapeutic privilege" not to disclose, which Judge Robinson retained as a
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ure" jurisdictions permit that affirmative defense? That's what
puzzles me. Perhaps a little background will demonstrate the reason for my puzzlement.
In medical malpractice actions brought on a theory of lack of
informed consent, the states divide into two major camps: those
that judge the adequacy of the physician's disclosure to the patient
by the professional standard of disclosure2 and those that repudiate the professional standard of disclosure and compel disclosure
of all material risks.3 Those in the first camp justify the use of the
professional standard of disclosure in terms of encouraging the
physician to utilize his professional judgment, in keeping with the
professional standard, to determine which risks to disclose and
which to withhold in order to avoid an adverse effect on the patient's physical or emotional well-being.
This determination involves medical judgment as to whether disclosure of
possible risks may have such an adverse effect on the patient as to jeopardize success of the proposed therapy, no matter how expertly performed.'

In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff, in order to make a legally sufficient case against the physician, must present expert medical testidefense to disclosure[.]
The therapeutic privilege not to disclose is merely a procedurally different way of
invoking the professional standard of care.
J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, pp 74-5 (Free Press 1984).
2. In David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full-Dis-

closure" Jurisdictions,14 Duquesne L R 309-11, n.1 and n.2 (1976), I indicated those states
that judge the adequacy of the disclosure by the professional standard of disclosure and
those that compel disclosure of all material risks, along with appropriate citations. A more
current "State-by-State Analysis" may be found in Rosoff, Informed Consent at 75 (cited in
note 1).
3. See note 2. A few notable changes in pre-existing law should be cited. Maryland,
which at one time apparently judged the adequacy of the disclosure by the professional
standard, Kruszewski v Holz, 265 Md 434, 290 A2d 534 (1972) (without specific decision,
trial court's use of professional standard referred to), subsequently compelled disclosure of
all material risks. Sard v Hardy, 281 Md 432, 379 A2d 1014 (1977). Oklahoma, which apparently permitted the plaintiff to proceed under either standard, Martin v Stratton, 515 P2d
1366 (Okla 1973) (but evidence insufficient as to both), subsequently adopted the standard
requiring disclosure of all material risks. Scott v Bradford, 606 P2d 554 (1979). Texas, which
at one time judged the adequacy of the disclosure by the professional standard of disclosure,
Karp v Cooley, 349 F Supp 827 (S D Tex 1972), aff'd 493 F2d 408 (5th Cir), cert denied, 419
US 845 (1974), applying Wilson v Scott, 412 SW2d 299 (Tex 1967), subsequently concluded
that, where the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel has not determined what risks must be
disclosed with regard to a particular procedure, the physician has the duty "to disclose all
risks or hazards which could influence a reasonable person in making a decision to consent
to the procedure." Peterson v Shields, 652 SW2d 929, 931 (Tex 1983).
4. Wilson v. Scott, 412 SW2d 299, 302 (Tex 1967), quoting from Aiken v Clary, 396
SW2d 668, 674 (Mo 1965). See note 3 for the current status of Texas law.
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mony to the effect that the professional standard of disclosure
mandated disclosure of the eventuated risk, complemented by additional evidence that the defendant failed to disclose that risk
and, had the risk been disclosed, consent to the proposed therapy
would not have been forthcoming.
Those states that require disclosure of all material risks - the
"full-disclosure" jurisdictions - do so for the purpose of preserving
the patient's right of self-determination.
Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.6

Those full-,disclosure jurisdictions apparently have concluded that,
as between protecting the physician's exercise of professional judgment and preserving the patient's right of self-determination, the
latter concern is paramount. In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff, in
order to make a legally sufficient case against the physician, is required to present expert medical testimony only to the effect that
there existed a medically cognizable risk of the eventuated injury,
complemented by additional evidence that the risk was material
and, had it been disclosed, consent to the therapy would not have
7
been forthcoming.
The full-disclosure jurisdictions are themselves divided into two
camps: those that judge materiality and consent by an objective
standard and those that judge materiality and consent subjectively.8 The former insist that application of an objective standard
is compelled by considerations of fairness to the physician and of
protecting the integrity of the judicial process.
[Judging materiality subjectively] would summon the physician to secondguess the patient, whose ideas on materiality could hardly be known to the
physician. That would make an undue demand upon medical practitioners,
whose conduct, like that of others, is to be measured in terms of
reasonableness.9

And:
5. See for example, Wilson v Scott, 412 SW2d 299, 301-02 (Tex 1967).
6. Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772, 784 (D C Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted), cert
denied, 409 US 1064.
7. See for example, Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772, 786-88, 790 (D C Cir 1972).
8. See for example, Canterburyv Spence, cited in note 6 (objective standard); Scott v
Bradford, 606 P2d 554, 557-58 (Okla 1979) (subjective standard). In adopting the subjective
standard, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was apparently influenced by Seidelson, 14 Duquesne L Rev 309 (cited in note 2).
9.

Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d at 787.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 29:39

[The subjective] method of dealing with the issue of causation [or consent]
comes in second-best. It places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's
hindsight and bitterness. It places the factfinder in the position of deciding
whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question is to be credited. It
calls for a subjective determination solely on testimony of a patient-witness
shadowed by the occurrence of the undisclosed risk.10

In those full-disclosure jurisdictions, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury that a reasonable
person in patient's circumstances would have considered the undisclosed risk significant in deciding whether or not to undergo the

proposed therapy and that,' apprised of the risk, a reasonable person in patient's circumstances would not have consented to the
therapy.1 1

The latter class of full-disclosure jurisdictions believes that determining materiality and consent subjectively is essential in order
to preserve the particular patient's right of self-determination, the
basic rationale for utilizing a full-disclosure approach. This class
recognizes that, if materiality and consent are judged objectively,
the particular patient's right of self-determination will be lost, to
the extent that the patient's views of materiality and consent
might have differed from those of a reasonable person in, like
circumstances.
Although the Canterbury rule is probably that of the majority, its "reasonable man" approach has been criticized by some commentators as backtracking on its own theory of self-determination. The Canterbury view certainly severely limits the protection granted an injured patient. To the
extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, would have declined the
proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances would
have consented, a patient's right of self-determination is irrevocably lost.
This basic right to know and decide is the reason for the full-disclosure rule.
10. Id at 790-91. In my opinion, when the court decides to judge materiality and consent objectively, it actually imposes on the plaintiff a dual burden: "demonstrating that
both he and a reasonable person in like circumstances would have considered the risk significant, and, apprised of the risk, neither he nor a reasonable person in like circumstances
would have consented." David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 Hofstra L Rev

621, 626 (1986) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See, Haven v Randolph, 342 F Supp
538 (D D C 1972), aff'd on other grounds per curiam, 494 F2d 1069 (D C Cir 1974); Henderson v Milobsky, 595 F2d 654 (D C Cir 1978) (opinion by the same judge who authored
Canterbury v Spence cited in note 6). But see, Hartke v McKelway, 707 F2d 1544 (D C Cir

1983), cert denied, 464 US 983.
Applying an objective, rather than a subjective, standard to materiality.and consent may
facilitate a matter-of-law determination that the medically cognizable risk was not material.
See Pauscher v Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 408 NW2d 355 (Iowa 1987).

11.

See for example, Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772, 787, 790-91 (D C Cir 1972).
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Accordingly, we decline to jeopardize this right by the imposition of the
"reasonable man" standard. 2

In those full-disclosure jurisdictions, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury that the patient
would have considered the undisclosed risk significant in deciding
whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy and that, apprised
of the risk, the patient would not have consented to the proposed
therapy.1 3 Yet, all of the full-disclosure jurisdictions, whether judging materiality and consent objectively or subjectively, afford the
physician the affirmative defense that his nondisclosure of the material, eventuated risk Was consistent with the professional standard of disclosure and the product of his professional judgment
that disclosure would have had an adverse effect on the patient's
physical or emotional well-being. 1' Why?
12. Scott v Bradford, 606 P2d at 559 (footnotes omitted).
13. See for example, Scott v Bradford, 606 P2d 554, 558-59 (Okla 1979).
14. The second exception [, emergency being the first,] obtains when risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view. It is recognized that patients occasionally
become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient. Where that is so, the cases have generally held that the physician
is armed with a privilege to keep the information from the patient, and we think it
clear that portents of that type may justify the physician in action he deems medically warranted. The critical inquiry is whether the physician responded to a sound
medical judgment that communication of the risk information would present a threat
to the patient's well-being.
Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d at 789 (footnotes omitted).
[T]he primary duty of a physician is to do what is best for his patient and where full
disclosure would be detrimental to a patient's total care and best interests a physician may withhold such disclosure, for example, where disclosure would alarm an
emotionally upset or apprehensive patient.
Scott v Bradford, 606 P2d at 558 (footnote omitted).
Situations may be envisioned where the disclosure of a risk to a patient would be
detrimental to the patient. The existence of such a situation is a matter of defense for
the doctor. The doctor may present evidence to justify the failure to disclose by his
own testimony or by the testimony of other lay or expert witnesses. The doctor may
establish the existence of a standard of nondisclosure by medical experts in his field
or practice. ...
Miller v Kennedy, 11 Wash App 272, 288, 522 P2d 852, 863 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85
Wash 2d 151, 530 P2d 334 (1975): "We can add nothing constructive to the well considered
opinion of [the] court and, accordingly, approve and adopt the reasoning thereof." 85
Wash2d at 151, 530 P2d at 334.

[T]he physician retains a qualified privilege to withhold information on therapeutic
grounds, as in those cases where a complete and candid disclosure of possible alternatives and consequences might have a detrimental effect on the physical or psychological well-being of the patient. . ..
Sard v Hardy, 281 Md 432, 444-45, 379 A2d 1014, 1022 (1977).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 29:39

To add to the enigma, we should note that, while all of the fulldisclosure jurisdictions afford the physician that affirmative defense, it is treated differently in different states. Some of the fulldisclosure jurisdictions apparently treat that affirmative defense as
other such defenses are treated: if the jury accepts the evidence
underlying the defense, the jury must find for the defendant.15 In
this particular context, that means, if the jury accepts the physician's evidence that nondisclosure was consistent with the professional standard of disclosure and the product of the physician's
professional judgment that disclosure would have had an adverse
effect on the patient's physical or emotional well-being, the jury
must find for the defendant. Other full-disclosure jurisdictions give
that particular affirmative defense an idiosyncratic treatment: even
if the jury accepts the physician's evidence that nondisclosure was
consistent with the professional standard of disclosure and the
product of the physician's professional judgment that disclosure
would have had an adverse effect on the patient's physical or emotional well-being, the, jury may still find for the plaintiff if the jury
concludes that no standard of nondisclosure should deprive a patient of the right of self-determination.1"
Now we are confronted with two enigmas. First, why should a
full-disclosure jurisdiction, already having determined that the patient's right of self-determination is paramount, permit the physician an affirmative defense based on the professional standard of
disclosure and the physician's professional judgment? It seems
fairly apparent that that affirmative defense is inherently inconsistent with the court's basic rationale for imposing the full-disclosure standard, a judicial determination that the patient's right of
self-determination is of greater moment and more deserving of judicial protection than a concern with encouraging the physician to
exercise his professional judgment to withhold disclosure of those
15. For example, the opinions in Canterbury v Spence, cited in note 8, and Scott v
Bradford, cited in note 8, suggest such a traditional treatment.
16. The doctor may establish the existence of a standard of nondisclosure by medical experts in his field or practice, but it is for the jury to accept or reject whether
any standard of nondisclosure should deprive a patient of his right of selfdetermination.
Miller v Kennedy, 11 Wash App at 288, 522 P2d at 852.
As in every informed consent case, the physician is free to introduce evidence of his
compliance with the prevailing medical standard of care to explain his failure to disclose. But such proof is not conclusive; it is still for the jury to decide whether adherence to the professional standard should deprive a patient of his right of selfdetermination.
Sard v Hardy, 281 Md at 445, 379 A2d at 1023.
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risks that the physician believes will have an adverse effect on the
patient's well-being. In those full-disclosure jurisdictions where the
affirmative defense is treated in the same manner as other affirmative defenses, that defense seems to have the potential of negating
the basic rationale for judicial imposition of the full-disclosure
17
standard: preserving the patient's right of self-determination.
Second, in those full-disclosure jurisdictions where the affirmative defense is afforded an idiosyncratic treatment, the jury is told,
in effect, that two standards exist for judging the physician's conduct and the jury is to determine which of those standards to utilize. Normally, of course, it is a judicial function to determine and
then instruct the jury as to the appropriate standard by which a
defendant's conduct is to be judged, leaving to the jury the factual
determination of whether or not the defendant's conduct was consistent with that prescribed standard. Why the abdication of that
usual judicial responsibility in those full-disclosure jurisdictions
giving the affirmative defense that idiosyncratic treatment?
Let us take up first the primary question: Why do full-disclosure
jurisdictions permit the physician to avoid liability by demonstrating that nondisclosure was consistent with the professional standard of disclosure and the product of a professional judgment that
disclosure would have had an adverse effect on the patient's physical or emotional well-being? Perhaps some insight can be gained
by examining other defenses available to the physician in a fulldisclosure jurisdiction. In Canterbury v Spence,' the affirmative
defense of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure
is coupled with another defense, the existence of an emergency. 9
In Scott v Bradford,20 the affirmative defense of compliance with
the professional standard is joined with emergency and risks already known to the patient.2 ' Does the rationale underlying those
17. In Canterbury, Dr. Spence claimed that "communication of that risk (paralysis) to the patient is not good medical practice because it might deter patients from
undergoing needed surgery and might produce adverse psychological reactions which
could preclude the success of the operation." Such-claims will almost invariably be
raised by physicians since they are derived from deeply held tenets of medical practice. Judge Robinson's enigmatic phrase of "just due" certainly suggests that the
medical professional standard would be applicable in such a case, raising profound
questions about the extent to which the novel legal standard has been swallowed up
by the traditional and venerable medical standard.
Katz, Silent World at 74-5 (cited in note 1).
18. See note 6.
19. Canterbury, 464 F2d at 788-89.
20. See note 8.
21. Scott, 606 P2d at 559.
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other defenses apply to compliance with the professional standard?
The emergency defense is fairly straightforward: if the medical exigencies preclude an opportunity for the physician to afford the patient a full disclosure, the physician may avoid liability for his failure to disclose the eventuated risk. Of course. No rational court
would subject the physician to liability for a failure to disclose
where the time necessary for such a disclosure would have transformed patient into cadaver.
How about pre-existing knowledge of the risk? If the eventuated
risk was already known to the patient, it would have been feckless
for the physician to have disclosed it and irrational for a court to
impose liability on the physician for a failure to disclose. In those
circumstances, the patient's right of self-determination would not
have been violated; he knew of the risk when he consented. But
neither of those rationales seems applicable to permitting the affirmative defense of compliance with the professional standard of
disclosure. Moreover, neither of those defenses, emergency or already known risk, wholly negates the physician's legal obligation to
disclose all material risks. The first defense is limited to circumstances where no opportunity for disclosure existed and the second
to risks already known by the patient. Neither of those defenses
approves of the physician's substituting his judgment for the informed judgment of the competent patient. Each is therefore quite
different from compliance with the professional standard of disclosure. That defense is inherently inconsistent with the obligation
to disclose all material risks.22 Neither the rationale underlying the
emergency defense nor that underlying already known risks is applicable to or seems to justify the existence of the defense of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure. Is there some
other explanation for the retention of that defense by full-disclosure jurisdictions?
I suspect that, in part, the answer may be judicial habit. In medical malpractice actions predicated on allegedly negligent performance, courts almost invariably judge the physician's conduct by the
professional standard of performance.2 3 When the theory of liabil22. See note 17.
23. [By undertaking to render medical services, . . . a doctor will ordinarily be
understood to hold himself out as having standard professional skill and knowledge.
The formula under which this usually is put to the jury is that the doctor must have
and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members
of the profession in good standing; and a doctor will be liable if harm results because
he does not have them.
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ity is shifted from negligent performance to negligent disclosure,
many courts opt to judge the adequacy of the disclosure by the
professional standard of disclosure. 24 In addition to the stated rationale of thereby encouraging physicians to utilize their professional judgment in deciding which risks, if disclosed, would have
an adverse effect on patients, I suspect those courts were influenced as well by the firmly entrenched habit of judging physicians
by a professional standard. And when some courts elected to impose a judicially fashioned standard requiring disclosure of all material risks, thereby protecting the patient's right of self-determination, they saw fit to afford the physician the affirmative defense
of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure, perhaps
out of the same habit and perhaps not fully appreciating that the
affirmative defense was inherently inconsistent with the full-disclosure rule.
There is nothing innately wrong with habit. We all do many
things out of habit and, frequently, compliance with habit produces an efficient and nearly unthinking method of accomplishing
a number of simple, though important, tasks. Before I retire for
the night, I lock the front door, check the kitchen to be sure that
all of the jets on the gas range are off, that the faucet is not leaking, and that the doors to the refrigerator and freezer are fully
closed. I check the utility room to be sure that the door to the fullsized freezer is fully shut, that there is no water leaking into the
stationary tubs, and that the water heater is functioning properly.
Then I set the thermostat for the night and go upstairs. And I do
all of that in less time than it took to write it down, simply because
it's all a matter of rote requiring virtually no intellectual effort.
But sometimes unthinking compliance with habit can produce
unfortunate results. When a full-disclosure jurisdiction permits the
physician the affirmative defense of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure, the court affords the physician the
capacity to negate the judicially-fashioned standard requiring disclosure of all material risks and, in the process, to override the patient's right of self-determination, the basic rationale for the fulldisclosure rule. That affirmative defense may lead to the ultimate
conclusion that protecting the physician's right to exercise professional judgment is superior to preserving the patient's right of selfdetermination. If habit is the explanation for permitting that afProsser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 186-87 (West, 5th ed 1984) (footnotes omitted).
24. See note 2.
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firmative
defense, it is an inadequate reason.
There may
be an additional explanation for full-disclosure jurisdictions' permitting that affirmative defense. To some extent, the
genesis of the lack of informed consent theory of liability may lie
in the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel to circumvent the "conspiracy of
silence,"2 5 the reluctance or outright refusal of physicians to testify
that a professional colleague, the defendant, had acted in a negligent manner. As noted earlier, in malpractice actions based on negligent performance, plaintiffs' counsel are almost invariably required to present expert medical testimony establishing a
professional standard of conduct inconsistent with the defendant's
performance. Given the reluctance or outright refusal of physicians
to provide such testimony, plaintiffs' counsel often found themselves stymied, irrespective of the merits of the cases. It may well
have been in an effort to circumvent that problem that plaintiffs'
counsel first began to articulate the theory of lack of informed consent as a different or alternative theory of liability, in the hope
that judicial acceptance of the theory might obviate the need for,
or shift the thrust of, any expert medical testimony. That hope was
realized only in part.
In those jurisdictions that judge the adequacy of the physician's
disclosure exclusively by the professional standard, the plaintiff, in
order to reach the jury, must present expert medical testimony
that the defendant's disclosure was not consistent with the professional standard of disclosure.2" Plaintiff's expert must testify that
the professional standard of disclosure mandated revelation of the
risk that ultimately eventuated and caused the plaintiff's injuries.
In short, the plaintiff's expert medical witness must offer explicit
testimony that the defendant's disclosure was negligent. In those
jurisdictions applying the full-disclosure rule, expert medical testi25. See for example, David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expect, 16 Cath U L Rev 158 (1966).
26. A number of cases in other jurisdictions hold that the plaintiff, in an action
against a physician for failure to disclose hazards, must prove a medical standard by
expert medical evidence. ...
We conclude therefore that the plaintiff had the burden to prove by expert medical
evidence what a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and same or similar community under the same or similar circumstances would have disclosed to his
patient about the risks incident to a proposed diagnosis or treatment, that the physician departed from that standard, causation, and damages. The action is one of malpractice for a physician's failure to conform to medical standards in obtaining the
patient's consent.
Wilson v Scott, 412 SW2d 299, 301-02 (Tex 1967).
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mony may still be required, but the plaintiff's expert will not be
required to present explicit inculpating evidence. Rather, the
plaintiff will be required to present expert testimony that the
eventuated risk was a medically cognizable risk incident to the
proposed therapy. 27 From that expert testimony, complemented by
the patient's testimony, a reasonable jury might be able to conclude that the physician failed to disclose a medically cognizable
risk, the undisclosed and eventuated risk was material, and, if disclosed, would have precluded consent. Under the full-disclosure
rule, that would constitute a legally sufficient case. Thus, while the
hope of plaintiffs' counsel that the lack of informed consent theory
would eliminate the need for expert medical testimony was never
realized, in full-disclosure jurisdictions at least the thrust .of the
required expert testimony was changed considerably. Plaintiff's expert is not required to give explicit testimony that the defendant's
disclosure was negligent. Instead, plaintiff's expert is required only
to offer the more benign testimony that the eventuated risk was a
medically cognizable risk incident to the procedure performed,
even when that procedure is performed properly. That shift in the
thrust of the required expert testimony might make it easier for
the plaintiff to secure a willing expert medical witness. And, indeed, some of the courts that adopted the full-disclosure rule may
have been influenced in part by their realization that the judicially-fashioned standard requiring disclosure of all material risks
would diminish the plaintiff's problem of securing the required expert medical testimony and thus facilitate the plaintiff's presenting
a legally sufficient case.2"
If the physician in the defense case then offers expert medical
testimony (including his own) that nondisclosure of the risk was
consistent with the professional standard of disclosure predicated
on the avoidance of adverse impact on the patient, such defense
27. There are obviously important roles for medical testimony in such cases, and
some roles which only medical evidence can fill. Experts are ordinarily indispensable
to identify and elucidate for the factfinder the risks of therapy and the consequences
of leaving existing maladies untreated.
Experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision on treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the
decision.
Canterbury, 464 F2d at 791-92.
28. Finally, as a practical matter, we must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding a physician who would breach the "community of silence" by testifying against
the interest of one of his professional colleagues.
Cooper v Roberts, 220 Pa Super 260, 267, 286 A2d 647, 650 (1971).
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evidence will not retroactively destroy-the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case. Plaintiff will still reach the jury. It is just that the jury,
instructed by the court as to the affirmative defense of compliance
with the professional standard of disclosure, may find for the defendant, even though the jury finds that the eventuated risk was
material, undisclosed, and, if disclosed, would have precluded consent. The plaintiff still would have reached the jury and the jury
could have found for the plaintiff, either because it did not accept
the defendant's evidence (in some full-disclosure jurisdictions) or
because, although accepting that evidence, the jury concluded that
no standard of nondisclosure should deprive a patient of the right
of self-determination (in other full-disclosure jurisdictions). What
could be fairer than that? Plaintiff's burden of presenting expert
medical testimony is eased because of the more benign thrust of
that testimony and, therefore, the plaintiff's ability to make a legally sufficient case is enhanced. And, once reaching the jury, the
plaintiff could prevail. At the same time, the physician's right to
rely on the professional standard of disclosure and his medical
judgment is not wholly eliminated. Instead, the full-disclosure
court repudiates the professional standard only for the limited
purpose of ruling on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's case.
That serves the litigation interests of both the patient and the
physician. Is that an acceptable reason for permitting the physician the affirmative defense?
Despite its surface appeal, that rationale, it seems to me, is not
an acceptable basis for affording the physician the affirmative defense of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure,
for several reasons. First, the language used by virtually all of the
full-disclosure courts is emphatic with regard to the preservation
of the patient's right of self-determination.29 That is the asserted
29. The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body ..
" True consent to what happens to one's self is
the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his
physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent
decision. From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn
the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a
decision possible.
It is a duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment, and that is surely a
fact of due care. It is, too, a duty to impart information which the patient has every
right to expect. The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which
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reason for the judicially fashioned standard compelling the physitraditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions. His dependence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being,
in terms of contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject.
Nor can we ignore the fact that to bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to
arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for the patient's
right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for
physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon
themselves.
Canterbury, 464 F2d at 780, 782, 784 (footnotes omitted).
The doctrine of informed consent. . . follows logically from the universally recognized
rule that a physician, treating a mentally competent adult under non-emergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake to perform surgery or administer other therapy without the prior consent of his patient. . . In order for the patient's consent to
be effective, it must have been an "informed" consent, one that is given after the
patient has received a fair and reasonable explanation of the contemplated treatment
or procedure. ...
The fountainhead of the doctrine of informed consent is the patient's right to exercise control over his own body, at least when undergoing elective surgery, by deciding
for himself whether or not to submit to the particular therapy. . . .As Judge Cardozo said [,] . . ."[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body." Other courts have bottomed the
physician's duty to disclose on the fiducial quality of the physician-patient relationship. . . .Whatever its source, the doctrine of informed consent takes full account of
the probability that unlike the physician, the patient is untrained in medical science,
and therefore depends completely on the trust and skill of his physician for the information on which he makes his decision. ...
Simply stated, the doctrine of informed consent imposes on a physician, before he
subjects his patient to medical treatment, the duty to explain the procedure to the
patient and to warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to
the therapy, so as to enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed choice
about whether or not to undergo such treatment ...
In recent years . . .an ever-expanding number of courts have declined to apply a
professional standard of care in informed consent cases, employing instead a general
or lay standard of reasonableness set by law and independent of medical custom.
These decisions recognize that protection of the patient's fundamental right of physical self-determination - the very cornerstone of the informed consent doctrine mandates that the scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alternatives be governed by the patient's informational needs. Thus, the appropriate test
is not what the physician in the exercise of his medical judgment thinks a patient
should know before acquiescing in a proposed course of treatment; rather, the focus is
on what data the patient requires in order to make an intelligent decision.
Sard v Hardy, 281 Md at 438-39, 442, 379 A2d at 1019-20, 1021 (footnotes omitted).
The scope of the duty to disclose information concerning the treatment proposed,
other treatments and the risks of each course of action and of no treatment at all is
measured by the patient's need to know. The inquiry as to each item of information
which the doctor knows or should know about the patient's physical condition is,
"Would the patient as a human being consider this item in choosing his or her choice
of treatment?....
Indeed, it is the prerogative of the patient to choose his treatment. A doctor may not
withhold from the patient the knowledge necessary for the exercise of that right.
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cian to disclose all material risks. None of those full-disclosure
courts (to my knowledge) has asserted that that judicially-fashioned standard exists for the sole or even primary purpose of striking a litigation compromise between patient and physician, one
easing the patient's burden of presenting a legally sufficient case
while simultaneously preserving the physician's right to rely on the
professional standard of disclosure.30 That may indeed be the ultimate result achieved by a full-disclosure court's permitting the
physician the affirmative defense of compliance with the profes:
sional standard. But that result is so directly at odds with the
avowed purpose of fashioning and imposing the full-disclosure rule
- preserving the patient's right of self-determination - that to accept that result as the rationale for affording the physician the
affirmative defense would be to impute to the full-disclosure courts
a distressing level of disingenuousness.
Second, to accept that result as an appropriate rationale for permitting the affirmative defense would be to mislead the patient
with regard to his expectations concerning the doctor-patient relationship. The explicit language of the full-disclosure courts informs
the patient that, in that relationship, he has the right to anticipate
revelation of all material risks incident to any proposed therapy.3 '
Without it, the prerogative is valueless.
Miller v Kennedy, 11 Wash App at 282-83, 522 P2d at 860-61 (footnotes omitted).
A patient's right to make up his mind whether to undergo treatment should not be
delegated to the local medical group. What is reasonable disclosure in one instance
may not be reasonable in another. We decline to adopt a standard based on the professional standard. We, therefore, hold the scope of a physician's communications
must be measured by his patient's need to know enough to enable him to make an
intelligent choice. In other words, full disclosure of all material risks incident to
treatment must be made. . . . A risk is material if it would be likely to affect patient's decision.
Scott v Bradford, 606 P2d at 558.
30. Even in Cooper v Roberts, 220 Pa Super 260, 286 A2d 647 (1971), where the court
noted that, "as a practical matter, we must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding a
physician who would breach the 'community of silence' by testifying against the interest of
one of his professional colleagues," 220 Pa Super at 267, 286 A2d at 650, that consideration
was only the "final[]," id, one in support of repudiating the professional standard of
disclosure.
[Tihe primary interest of Pennsylvania jurisprudence in regard to informed consent
is that of having the patient informed of all the material facts from which he can
make an intelligent choice as to his course of treatment, regardless of whether he in
fact chooses rationally. Although we have high regard for the professionalism of the
medical community, the standard of disclosure exercised therein bears no inherent
relationship to the amount of knowledge that any particular patient might require in
order to make an informed choice.
220 Pa Super at 266, 286 A2d at 650.
31. See note 29.
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To assert simultaneously as a rationale for the affirmative defense
that, as the result of a litigation compromise, the doctor has the
right to rely on the professional standard of disclosure, would be to
mislead or confuse the patient perhaps as profoundly as any physician's disclosure that withheld material risks. It is damaging
enough to the patient's expectations that that result obtains under
the existing law. To attempt to justify that result in terms of a
tacit judicially-effected litigation compromise would be an added
affront to every layman who is party to a doctor-patient relationship in a full-disclosure jurisdiction.
Finally, that litigation compromise is based on a tacit quid pro
quo. The patient will be afforded some relief from the conspiracy
of silence and the adverse impact that has on his ability to make a
legally sufficient case, by amending the thrust of the required expert medical testimony; the physician, in exchange, will be afforded the legal right to rely on the professional standard of disclosure. There are two things wrong with that bargain. The first is
that the conspiracy of silence was a conspiracy among physicians.
To ameliorate the plight of the patient occasioned by that conspiracy at the price of affording the physician the right to rely on the
professional standard would be to reward physicians for having
successfully conspired not to testify. That's hardly an elegant bargain for any court to strike. Second, the conspiracy of silence, awesomely successful until perhaps the mid-1960s, has lost much of its
clout. Thanks to the growing number of physicians willing to testify for plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions, 2 judicial willingness to permit a physician in one specialty to testify in an action
against a physician in another specialty,3 3 and judicial repudiation
32. I confess that I do not know why, starting in the mid-1960s, there emerged physicians who were willing to testify for plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. Purely as a
matter of speculation, it may have been because a number of those physicians, while in
medical school, took courses in Forensic Medicine and came face-to-face with the conspiracy
of silence. Some of them may have found that confrontation unpalatable. Apparently, some
risk may still attach to the physician who testifies for plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. See Kiepfer v American Physicians Ins. Exch., No. 5A-85-CA-3140 (W D Tex, May
31, 1989), reported at 32 ATLA L Rep 471 (Dec 1989) (boycott of testifying physician).
33. "While the court may rule that a certain subject of inquiry requires that a member
of a given profession, as a doctor, . . . be called [,] usually a specialist in a particular branch
within a profession will not be required." Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence 34
(3d ed 1984) and see note 10. In addition, see Baerman v Reisinger, 363 F2d 309 (D C Cir
1966) (general practitioner competent to establish standard for cardiologist in diagnosing
hypothyroidism); Radman v Harold, 279 Md 167, 367 A2d 472 (1977), aft'g, 31 Md App 184,
355 A2d 477 (1976) (internist competent to establish standard for gynecologist in performing hysterectomy); Kosberg v Washington Hospital Center, 394 F2d 947 (D C Cir 1968)
(treating internist competent to establish standard for psychiatrist in deciding patient's
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of the "community standard,"3" the conspiracy of silence no longer
possesses its one-time capacity to stifle malpractice actions irrespective of their merits. Consequently, for a contemporary court to
afford the patient partial relief from the conspiracy by altering the
thrust of the required expert testimony at the cost of negating the
patient's right of self-determination by allowing the physician the
defense of compliance with the professional standard of disclosure
is hardly a fair bargain for the patient. For all of those reasons, the
litigation compromise is not a persuasive rationale for affording the
physician the affirmative defense of compliance with the professional standard in a full-disclosure jurisdiction.
Is there some additional reason that has impelled full-disclosure
courts to recognize compliance with the professional standard as
an affirmative defense? Dr. Jay Katz has written:
The history of the doctrine of informed consent illuminates the difficulties
of resolving the conflicting tensions that judges were confronted with when
they attempted to extend patients' rights to self-determination. Judges perceived the conflict to be one between liberty and caring custody. 5

Perhaps that judicially perceived tension is the explanation for
recognition of the affirmative defense by full-disclosure courts.
While motivated to preserve the patient's right of self-determination, the courts have not been prepared to eliminate entirely the
physician's caring professional judgment that certain risks, if disclosed, would adversely affect the patient's physical or emotional
well-being. Thus, the courts may have concluded that they were
affording the patient the best of both worlds: the right to be apprised of all material risks except those that, if disclosed, would
harm rather than help him. That humanistic rationale has enorability to withstand electroshock therapy).
34. Formerly it was generally held that allowance must be made for the type of
community in which the physician carries on his practice, and for the fact, for example, that a country doctor could not be expected to have the equipment, facilities,
libraries, contacts, opportunities for learning, or experience afforded by large cities.
Since the standard of the "same" locality was obviously too narrow, this was commonly stated as that of "similar localities," thus including other towns of the same
general type. Improved facilities of communication, travel, availability of medical
literature, and the like, have led some courts to abandon a fixed locality rule in favor
of treating the community as one factor to be taken into account in applying the
general professional standard. In other jurisdictions the "locality rule" has been discarded outright, and a general national standard applied in all cases, especially in the
case of medical specialists.
Prosser & Keeton, Torts 187-88. See also, Morrison v MacNamara, 407 A2d 555 (D C 1979)
(national standard applied to method of administering urethral smear test).
35.

Katz, Silent. World at 48.
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mous appeal. It implies the existence not only of a caring physician
but of a caring judiciary as well. The patient, already discomposed
by the actual or feared illness or injury, should enjoy the right to
be apprised of all material risks incident to the proposed procedure
or therapy, excepting those risks that in the caring professional
judgment of the physician, corroborated by the professional standard of disclosure, would, if disclosed, exacerbate the patient's discomposure to the point of adversely affecting his physical or emotional well-being. Even if those latter risks were to be disclosed,
the patient, now all the more disturbed, could hardly be expected
to make a dispassionate decision. And even if he should acquiesce
in the proposed procedure or therapy after being informed of that
latter class of particularly disconcerting risks, the contemplated
beneficial effects of the proposed procedure or therapy could be
diminished. Only an inhumane physician would reveal that latter
class of risks and only an inhumane court would compel such disclosure. That, I think, may be the most likely and perhaps the
most compelling reason for full-disclosure courts to continue to afford the physician the affirmative defense of compliance with the
professional standard of disclosure.
Now we must determine if that reason is an appropriate rationale for affording that defense. When a court determines to embrace
the full-disclosure rule, a judicially fashioned standard compelling
disclosure of all material risks, that court has concluded that the
patient's right of self-determination is paramount. The court has
opted to preserve that right of patient autonomy over the competing rationale underlying the decision of those other courts that
judge the disclosure exclusively by the professional standard of
disclosure: protecting the physician's exercise of his professional
judgment. The full-disclosure courts have elected to favor an approach that makes the patient the master of his own fate over the
competing paternalistic approach that suggests "the doctor knows
best." That preference inherently acknowledges that, as between
the patient and the physician, it is the former who should decide
what is or is not to be done to the patient and that the patient's
decision must be an informed one. Logically, that conclusion cannot coexist with a rule allowing the physician a defense based on a
professional judgment as to which risks are to be disclosed and
which concealed. Beyond pure logic, the judicial standard requiring
the disclosure of all material risks recognizes the patient as being
capable of making decisions, properly informed. Presumably, that
recognition of patient capacity extends not only to the easy deci-
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sions but to the difficult ones as well. Indeed, if it did not, the
patient's right of self-determination would be nearly meaningless.
To conclude that the patient somehow loses that capacity when
the decisions become difficult imputes to the patient an absence of
capacity inimical to autonomy. Yes, it's true that some risks, if disclosed, may exacerbate the patient's already discomposed condition. It may even be true that that exacerbation may diminish the
efficacy of the proposed procedure or therapy. While that may
make it difficult for the physi6ian to disclose, and difficult even for
a full-disclosure court to compel disclosure, both should realize
that the difficulty is inherent in the basic determination that it is
the patient, not the physician, who is to make the decision. The
shibboleth that "I'm doing this for your own good," when applied
to a competent adult, even one discomposed by concern, is generally most appropriately met with the response, "Thanks, but no
thanks."
Let us consider a rather dramatic hypothetical case. Patient is
afflicted with a serious illness. Procedures and therapies are available. If utilized they may ameliorate or even cure the illness. But
their utilization is attended with significant, medically cognizable
risks. The physician, deeply committed to ameliorating or curing
illness, believes strongly that the procedures will accomplish that
end and, therefore, should be utilized. The physician also believes
that, if the patient is informed of the attendant risks, the patient
may suffer serious emotional repercussions perhaps triggering impaired cardiac functioning or even a heart attack. Let us assume
that in such circumstances the professional standard of disclosure
would mandate withholding disclosure of those risks. It is not difficult to imagine the physician's reluctance to disclose those risks or
even a full-disclosure court's reluctance to compel disclosure. The
former, a healer by vocation, wishes to do nothing to harm the patient. The latter, although committed to a patient's right of selfdetermination, may feel that to deny the physician the legal right
to withhold such risks from the patient might result in a compelled
disclosure resulting in detriment to the patient. Should the physician in those circumstances be deemed to have the right not to
make a full disclosure?
If that question is answered affirmatively, the ineluctable result
is that it is the physician, not the patient, who becomes the ultimate decision-maker. And if the medically cognizable risks incident to the proposed procedure are such that their mere disclosure
may trigger emotional repercussions, impaired cardiac functioning,
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or even a heart attack, those risks must be grave. To conclude that
their gravity justifies nondisclosure would be to deny the patient
his right of self-determination where that right is most important.
To leave the patient to decide whether or not to undergo the proposed procedure ignorant of the gravest risks incident to that procedure would be to sacrifice the patient's right of self-determination when the medically cognizable risks incident to the proposed
procedure pose the greatest peril to the patient. That result would
be contrary to the basic rationale underlying the full-disclosure
standard both in terms of logic and humanism.
Let us fashion another dramatic hypothetical case. Patient is afflicted with a terminal illness. Procedures and therapies are available. If utilized, they may extend the patient's life. But their utilization is attended with medically cognizable risks that may seriously
and adversely affect the quality of that extended life. The physician, deeply committed to extending human life, believes strongly
that the procedures and therapies will accomplish that end and
therefore should be utilized. The physician also believes that, if the
patient is informed fully as to the likelihood and term of extended
life, the nature and extent of the medically cognizable risks, and
the prognosis absent such procedures and therapies, the patient
will not consent to those procedures. The physician believes too
that such a full disclosure would have an adverse effect on the patient's physical and emotional well-being and might even diminish
the efficacy of those procedures if performed. Let us assume as well
that, in such circumstances, the professional standard of disclosure
would mandate something considerably less than a full disclosure.
Should the physician be deemed to have the legal right to withhold
a full disclosure?
Once again, if that question is answered affirmatively, the result
is that it becomes the physician, not the patient, who assumes the
role of the ultimate decision-maker. That conclusion is so inherently at odds with preservation of the patient's right of self-determination, the basic reason for the full-disclosure rule, that the two
cannot coexist, not as a matter of logic and not as a matter of humanism. Acquisition of information, bad news as well as good, is a
necessary concomitant of decision-making. When the physician is
the only practical source of that information, he should be compelled to disclose it; otherwise the patient's right of self-determination is more illusory than real. In humanistic terms, to deprive the
terminally-ill patient of the opportunity to make an informed
choice from among the available alternatives is nearly impossible
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to justify. It would treat the terminally-ill patient as something
less than a competent adult. It would strip him of his ability to
decide his own destiny from among the limited, unpleasant available alternatives. It would deny him the ability to weigh the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each course in an informed,
meaningful manner. In short, it would be grossly inappropriate.
If, even in those dramatic situations, fashioned to create the
most appealing cases for recognition of a right of non-disclosure,
such a right is not persuasively supported, and I think it is not,
that right has no legitimate role to play in a full-disclosure jurisdiction. Even the most likely and compelling reason for full-disclosure courts to permit the physician the affirmative defense of
compliance with the professional standard is not persuasive. In negating the patient's right of self-determination, the defense violates both a sense of logic and a humanistic view of the patient. It
should not be allowed.
There remains one additional question: Why do some of the fulldisclosure courts, while allowing the defense, treat it in an idiosyncratic manner, permitting the jury to find for the plaintiff even if
the jury accepts the evidence underlying the defense? It could be
argued, I suppose, that that idiosyncratic treatment reflects a judicial determination that the jury, serving as a microcosm of society,
should make the ultimate determination of which should prevail,
the patient's right of self-determination or the physician's right to
rely on professional judgment. Such an argument would rest on the
predicate that, in resolving that tension, society's representative,
the jury, rather than the court, should be the final arbiter. The
jury, representing society, is better able to strike the appropriate
balance. I confess that I find the argument wanting, for a couple of
reasons. First, the same thing could be said of every case in which
an affirmative defense exists. Yet, in virtually all other cases, the
court will instruct the jury that, if it accepts the evidence underlying the affirmative defense, it must find for the defendant. Second,
I am just cynical enough to disbelieve that the idiosyncratic treatment is the product of a judicial conclusion that society's representative should decide. Rather, I believe it is the result of a particular full-disclosure court's tacit recognition of the impropriety of the
affirmative defense coupled with a judicial reluctance to eliminate
the professional standard entirely, whether that reluctance is the
product of habit, an awkward litigation compromise, or a misguided sense of humanism. More directly stated, I believe that idiosyncratic treatment is the product of a judicial effort to fop off on
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the jury what is more properly a judicial function: to decide
whether the affirmative defense can coexist with a full-disclosure
standard based on the patient's right of self-determination. The
responsibility for making that decision rests with the court. And
the court should make it consistently with logic and humanism (as
well as the court's tacit recognition that the two standards cannot
coexist) and eliminate that affirmative defense. Only then will the
patient's right of self-determination truly be preserved.

